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An approach to search for structural breaks in lending rates pass-through in the wake of EMU is 
proposed and implemented for Italy and Portugal. Breakpoints cluster in the second semester 1999 
and the equilibrium pass-through on short term lending is, in contrast with earlier research, sizeably 
lower in the post-break period; in the Italian case, the adjustment to the equilibrium is however  
faster. The recently proposed distinction between monetary policy and cost-of-funds approaches 
does not yield different break-points. These results challenge the widely held view that EMU has in 
its wake enhanced the effectiveness of monetary transmission. A strengthened relationship lending 
could at least partly explain the reduced equilibrium pass-through in the Italian case.  
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The transmission of monetary policy hinges on how bank rates react to changes in the 
money market rates, especially in a bank-based economy. Several studies investigate whether size 
and speed of the pass-through (PT) of monetary policy impulses to retail bank interest rates in the 
euro zone have increased in the wake of Stage Three of EMU, thus enhancing the effectiveness of 
the single monetary policy, and converged, thus rendering more uniform the transmission via the 
banking sector.  
Angeloni and Ehrman (2003) argue that since January 1999 PTs have become on average 
larger and faster across the euro area and in most of the largest countries, thus strengthening the 
transmission of monetary policy. Some papers however challenge this influential view, first of all 
because break-points should not be exogenously assumed. A second debated issue, within the PT 
empirical literature, is the often arbitrary choice of the driving market rate, that should instead 
match the maturity of the loans the lending rate refers to. Thirdly, no structural break has been 
found when modelling an index of lending rates in an euro area monthly monetary model 
(Bruggeman-Donnay 2003). 
The variety of results in the literature motivates this paper, that proposes a new approach to 
reassess the evidence of structural breaks in the equilibrium PT  for short term lending rates in two 
case studies: Italy and, though less thoroughly examined, Portugal. These are the two EMU 
countries where, according to recent studies, break-point dates are up to 4/5 years apart, when 
different driving market rates are chosen (Sander-Kleimeier 2004b, Table 1). The main contribution 
of this paper is to show that in both countries recent break-points cluster instead in the second 
semester 1999, thus excluding expectations effects of the monetary unification, with sizably 
reduced equilibrium PTs; in the case of Italy, the adjustment to the equilibrium is however  faster.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the recent literature on retail interest 
rates PT in the EMU, with special reference to Italy and Portugal. Section 3 proposes a new 
methodology to search for break-points in cointegrated relations and implements it for Italy. Section 
4 replicates more concisely the exercise for Portugal. Section 5 offers a tentative interpretation of 
the findings for Italy. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The pass-through in the wake of Stage Three of EMU 
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  1 
The empirical literature on bank rates PT in the EMU shares the same theoretical framework 
but often produces conflicting results, owing to different approaches in the econometric 
investigation. The reference setting is the standard Klein-Monti model of a monopolistic bank - 
with risk neutrality, perfect information, no switching costs and no joint production of loans and 
deposits -, easily extended in an oligopolistic structure of the banking industry (Freixas-Rochet 
1997). The lending rate is determined as a mark-up over the marginal (opportunity) cost, identified 
with the money rate directly influenced by the central bank. In empirical applications, assuming a 
linear approximation, the marginal cost coefficient is interpreted as the equilibrium PT, with a 
reference unitary value in a competitive market and lower values (i.e. higher variable mark-up) in 
the monopolistic case. Within this framework, studies differ mostly on how to proxy the marginal 
cost, in order to match the maturity of the credit aggregate underlying the lending rate.   
The estimates of the impact and equilibrium PT parameters are usually obtained 
reparametrizing an Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ADL) specification, as originally proposed in 
Cottarelli-Kourelis (1994), as an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM), following the Granger 
representation theorem for cointegrated variables.  
Let a long run equilibrium or cointegrated relation between interest rates integrated of order 
one, or I(1): 
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with I(0) OLS residuals, ecm,  at the first stage of the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step estimation  
procedure (EG), where: 
-  r = bank rate; 
-  rm =  driving market interest rate; 
-  ecm = stationary deviation (“error” in the ECM acronym) of the bank rate from its long run 
equilibrium value, assumed to be a linear transformation of  rm.   
In the EG second stage the short term dynamics parameters are estimated from:  
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where ∆ is the first difference operator.  
The key parameters, from an economic point of view, are γ0 and β, that is the impact and 
equilibrium PTs, and θ, that is the speed the error is corrected.  
The empirical choice of the (weakly) exogenous driving market rate motivates the recently 
proposed distinction between a “monetary policy approach” (MPA), with the overnight rate taken as 
  2a proxy for the monetary policy stance, and an industrial organization inspired “cost-of-funds 
approach” (CoFA), with the market interest rate better proxying the marginal cost of loaned funds 
(Sander-Kleimeier 2004a, b). The difference between the two approaches depends on how the 
monetary stance is thought to influence the very short end of the yield curve, possibly in relation 
with agents’ expectations. The choice of a specific market rate or, alternatively, of a combination of 
several ones, to proxy the “true” marginal cost, as in de Bondt et al (2003), depends on the range of 
maturitues of the credit aggregate underlying the lending rate. Similar choices can in fact distort 
comparisons across countries, if lending practices have quite different repricing schedules. This is 
one likely cause of the heterogeneity in the results of the literature on short term lending rates PT in 
the EMU, the issue this paper focuses on. 
The heterogeneity refers to the date of structural breaks,  possibly associated with the advent 
of Stage Three of EMU, as well as to the size of equilibrium PTs and the speed of adjustment. 
Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003) argue that a single bank reserves market and the reduction in the 
market interest rates volatility due to the operating procedures of the ECB have already produced 
larger and faster bank rates PTs. They report, having identified informally, via rolling-window 
regressions, January 1999 as a break-point, that  both the impact and the maximum size of PTs for a 
set of lending and deposit rates have on average sizably increased in the period 1999-2002, 
compared to 1990-1998, in four of the largest EMU countries, Germany being the exception, and in 
the euro area as a whole. Business loans in the euro area show between the pre-1999 and the 
successive period the largest increase in the impact and peak coefficients, the latter reaching 1.1. de 
Bondt (2005), on the contrary, finds that for all euro area retail bank rates, except the mortgage rate, 
the equilibrium PT in the sample period after the introduction of euro (January 1999-June 2001) is 
lower than in the extended period (January 1996-June 2001). In particular, using a one-step ECM 
model, β shrinks from 1.53 to 0.88 for the short term lending rate to firms. A Chow test rejects at 
the 5% significance level the null of no structural break at January 1999.   
These conflicting findings could be, inter alia, motivated by the unharmonised national data 
for bank rates underlying euro-area data. The empirical literature exploring national data series, 
however, provides even more heterogeneous outcomes - on break-points and PTs – as shown in the 
case of short term lending rates, the ones that better match for maturity the driving market rates   
(short-term lending rate to firms, r
ST , for Italy and rate on commercial bills, r
CB , for Portugal; on 
data definition see Section 3 and Appendix 1; Tables 1-2).  
de Bondt et al. (2003) do not detect a structural break in January 1999 in Italy, in an 
empirical framework with the distinguishing feature of a driving market rate proxied by a 
combination, with estimated weights, of the 3-months interbank and of the 10-years Government 
  3bond rates, under the assumption that the latter provides a signal on the persistence of changes of 
the short term rates. This finding notwithstanding, the paper provides estimates for the entire April 
1994-December 2002 period and for the subsample beginning January 1999. They show a small 
reduction in the impact PT and a larger one in the equilibrium PT of the interbank rate (from 0.93 to 
0.76), whereas the equilibrium parameter with respect to the 10-years rate reverses sign, from 
positive (0.12) to negative (-0.15). The estimation results are similar and even sharper for Portugal, 
with equilibrium PT falling from (sizably) above to less than one.  
Sander and Kleimeier (2004a) estimate Eq. (1) with alternative driving market rates - 
overnight (rm
ON; MPA) and one-month interbank (rm
INT; CoFA) - and empirically determine 
whether, between January 1993 and October 2002, a single structural break is occurred; once 
detected it, they provide an EG estimate of Eq. (2)  before and after the break-point. Their findings 
for Italy are that a) according to the MPA, the break-point is February 1995 and the equilibrium PT 
reduces slightly below unity, with a larger decrease of the impact PT, whereas b) for the CoFA the 
break-point is July 1999, and a slight increase in the impact PT is associated with a sizable 
reduction for the equilibrium one (from 1 to 0.7). Considering also  r
TOP , namely the minimum 
lending rate for top rated firms, a break-point occurs in February-95 only with the MPA; the 
equilibrium PT remains however pretty unchanged, near unity. The findings are more striking 
across the two approaches for Portugal
1. The break-points are more than 5 years apart - July-94 and 
October-99 – and the equilibrium PT  varies very considerably, rising with the MPA (from 0.26 to 
1.52) and falling with the CoFA (from 1.24 to 0.65) for r
CB . The same pattern in dating break-




                          [TABLES 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
3 – The econometric investigation in the Italian case 
3.1 - Methodology 
 
To endogeneously search for possibly EMU-related structural breaks and, once detected, 
successively estimate the impact and equilibium PTs, as well as the speed of correction of the 
“error”, the  methodology proposed in this paper is as follows.   
1)  Endogeneous search for break-points in the long run model (Eq. 1), adopting the 
supremum F (supF) testing procedure, where the date is associated with the largest of the standard 
  4rolling Chow F-statistics computed under the hypothesis of a break occurring in each subsequent 
period through the mid-70% sample period (Andrews 1993), for the case of I(1) regressors (Hansen 
1992). The innovation we propose, following Bai (1997), to this procedure, implemented by 
Kleimeier and Sander (2004a,b)
2 and Toolsema et al (2002), is that, with several local maxima, 
statistically significant
3, the algorithm should be repeated, starting from the earliest break-point, to 
pick up the latest one, which it is more interesting from an EMU perspective.   
2)  Check that lending and driving market rates are I(1) through Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests in the break-free periods.    
3)  Check that in the same periods the OLS estimation at the first stage of  Eq. (1) 
generates I(0) residuals, thus rejecting the null of no cointegration. This should help mitigate the 
well known problems of low power of tests for cointegration in the presence of breaks (Maddala-
Kim 1998).  
4)     If the no cointegration hypothesis is rejected, estimation of an ECM specification (Eq. 
2) following the EG procedure. The optimal number of lags, allowing for a maximum of three,  is 
determined according to the minimum Akaike Information criterion. The first-stage β estimate is 
superconsistent, but biased in small samples, and the bias is inversely proportional to the fit 
(Banerjee et al., 1986). For robustness, an alternative one-step, general-to-specific (Hendry 1995), 
procedure is therefore also used, to jointly estimate short term and equilibrium PTs, in  an ECM 
specification combining Eqs. (1) and (2) through suitable non-linear restrictions:  
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This procedure, justified when the explanatory variable is (weakly) exogenous for β, as it is 
safe to assume for a driving market rate set in the highly integrated European money market, has 
two interesting features. First, an alternative check of cointegration can be implemented through the 
Ericsson-MacKinnon (2002; EM) test, adjusted for the degrees of freedom, specifically designed for 
this estimation procedure; second, it allows to assess the precision in estimating β, the t-ratio at the 
EG first stage being not interpretable as usual.   
5)  The PT can be potentially asymmetric for positive or negative changes in the driving 
rate: as a consequence, a robustness check of the results obtained for the basic symmetric 
specification is carried out introducing separate regressors, according to their sign, for the short 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1 Owing to the availability of the data used, the starting date is January 1993 for MPA and October 1994 for CoFA, with 
the consequences on the results detailed in Section 4.  
2 Mid-80% sample period in their studies.  
  5term dynamics. An extension of the exercise to the equilibrium parameters was deemed problematic 
given the limited length of the sample period.    
 
3.2 The data  
 
The short term lending rates analyzed are, as in the literature surveyed, r
ST for the larger 
credit aggregate and r
TOP, both drawn from the ECB National Retail Interest Rates (NRIR) database 
(see Appendix 1). This paper adds the overdraft rate r
OD, because it may provide further insights to 
the PT empirical analysis because it improves on r
ST on two accounts: a) it refers to contracts with 
homogeneous characteristics for (low) maturity and interest rate fixation; b) the underlying stocks 
outstanding are not the result of a stratification of past 18 months market conditions, being rather 
more similar to new businesses, as it happens for the NRIR lending rates of all other EMU 
countries. In spite of the high correlation even of the differenced series of   r
ST  and r
OD (see Table 
A1), the econometric investigation for the two rates produces indeed quite different results.  
The sample period goes from January 1993
4 to February 2004, the last month the series are 
available in the NRIR database (Figure 1). 
                                              
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
3.3  – Results 
 
The results are reported following the sequence of steps of the proposed methodology.   
1) The rolling Chow F-test statistics, after a local maximum at the beginning of 1995 for all 
bank rates, follow differentiated paths afterwards
5. The statistics settle around a plateau between 
1998 and 1999, and the results are invariant with the choice of the driving rate, for both  r
ST and r
OD. 
The path is much smoother for r
TOP, signalling no structural change in the relation with rm
INT after 
the first break, whereas with rm
ON a statistically significant local maximum is detected at end-1996 
(Figures 2a-b).  
Repeating the algorithm for the period after the last break the supF procedure indicates for 
each bank rate only one statistically significant absolute maximum (Figures 3a-b): 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 The critical asymptotic values of the supF with I(1) regressors are 16.2, 12.4 and 10.6, at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively (Hansen 1992, Table 1).   
4 Data for many EMU countries are available only since early 1990s. Following the literature, the sample period starts 
after the 1992 EMS crisis.     
  6-  r
ST  and r
OD (CoFA): June 1999; 
-  r
ST (MPA): July 1999;  
-  r
OD (MPA): November 1999; 
-  r
TOP (MPA): October 1997. 
 
                              [FIGURES 2 E 3 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
It is worth remarking that the date of the latest structural break for r
ST  is, according to the 
MPA, more than 4 years later than in Sander-Kleimeier (2004a,b), while it almost coincides with 
the date suggested by the CoFA..  
As an encompassing check we investigated whether these earlier results could be explained 
following our proposed approach. Using the same sample period – from January 1993 to October 
2002 - and data set
6 the supF  procedure considering only the absolute maxima detects in fact 
almost identical break-points (April 1995 with MPA and June 1999 with CoFA for r
ST and March 
1995 for r
TOP with MAP
7; Figure A1). The interesting feature is, however, that repeating the supF 
procedure after these dates yields findings very similar to our own: the late break-points are June 
1999 for r
ST  with both approaches and October 1997 for r
TOP with MAP (Figure A2).  
2) Checking the order of integration of each interest rate series in the pre- and post-break  
periods shows that the null of integration of order one cannot be rejected, at high confidence levels, 
for the market interest rates; the same does not hold for the lending rates (Table A2). More 
precisely, using first the ADF test for the series in levels and, if satisfied, also in differences,  the 
null is rejected in the pre-break period for each bank rate in level form, though the statistic is near 
the critical values; in the case of r
OD  the confidence level reaches the 1% p-value. The test for the 
differenced series is instead always satisfied, at least at the 5% significance level. Due to the low 
power of these asymptotic tests for relatively small samples the EG procedure is anyway 
implemented; it is stopped at the first stage when the no cointegration null fails to be rejected.                 
3) In the pre- and post-break periods Eq. (1) is estimated at the first stage associating each 
lending rate with either rm
ON or rm
INT; only one relation is estimated for the couple r
TOP and rm
INT. 
Standard Cointegrating Regressions Durbin-Watson (CRDW) and ADF tests are computed, under 
the null of non-stationary OLS residuals (Table 3).  
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 The first local maxima occur in January and March 1995 with rm
INT  and rm
ON as driving rate, respectively. To search 
for the successive break-point the sample starts at April 1995, in order to exclude, as in earlier studies, the March 
outlier, with approximately  200 basis points increase in market rates.     
6 Overnight and 1 month interbank rates are drawn from Datastream.  
7 For unspecified reasons the estimation sample for r
TOP with CoFA starts at July 1994 in Sander-Kleimeier (1994b), the 
month with an absolute maximum for supF according our encompassing exercise.   
  7These tests, with a well known low power in small samples, provide divergent outcomes and 
the  statistics are generally close to critical values. The null is however almost always rejected at the 
10% significance level at least by one test. The exception is r
OD  in the pre-break period, only when 
the driver is rm
INT. This result is interesting, because the earlier finding of the r
OD series failing the 
unit root test, even at the 1% significance level, would have led to expect an outcome of no 
cointegration with any I(1) market rate.  
4) The EG procedure with Eq. (2) for the three lending rates produces overall smaller and 
less precise estimates of the speed of error correction, θ, compared with the single-equation 
alternative. This is reassuring, because a persistent disequilibrium, if the cointegration relation is 
accepted, is implausible from an economic point of view. Symmetrically, a cautionary note is raised 
when, though the long run relationship between r
OD and rm
ON  passes the cointegration test in the 
pre-break period, the estimated θ in the second step turns out to be not significantly different from 
zero, and the same happens for r
ST  in the pre-break period. 
The EM test, computed as a t-ratio of the OLS estimate θ for Eq. (3), is useful because it 
focuses on the economic meaning of the parameter: considering again the  r
OD case, only with  
rm
INT as a driving rate the test is passed and a plausibile θ is obtained (one fifth of the error is 
corrected in a month). The EM test turns out to be more severe, as it can be gathered from the 
several instances of failures with rm
ON as driving rate. These results suggest that rm
INT   is 
empirically preferable to rm
ON, despite of their high correlation, at least partly because of the lower 
variability of the former.  
Let us consider now the more interesting parameter for a PT study. The results of the EG 
procedure can be summarized as follows.   
 




OD . As expected, owing to the high correlation between the market rates and even 
more among the bank rates (Table A1), the results are similar with either driving rate. The estimated 
β in the post-break period is sizably below unity and shrinks by at least one fourth compared to the 
previous period (from 0.95 to 0.7 for r
ST); in the EMU period, the β for  r
ST  is lower by about one 
sixth compared to r
OD, thus signalling how “special” are overdraft loans..  
The main findings with the one-step procedure do not differ greatly, though they provide 
some interesting integrations. β is significantly different from unity in the post break period: the 
largest estimate, at a 95% confidence level, is less than 0.8 for r
ST  and even 0.7 for r
OD. The 
estimates are systematically lower than those obtained with the EG procedure: for r
ST, the difference 
  8is of the order of magnitude of the 95% confidence interval, a clue to a small sample bias (Banerjee 
et al 1986). β is instead always above or equal to unity in the pre-break period.   
The estimates for the impact PT, γ0, a typical index of rate stickiness, are almost identical 
between the two periods for r
ST, whatever the estimation procedure or the driving market rate. The 
results for r
OD are comparable to the long run ones: for instance, with rm
INT, cointegration tests 
passed in both periods, γ0 shrinks by almost a half (0.11 instead of  0.19) and is about one third of 
the corresponding parameter for r
ST.  
To sum up on the adjustment speed, θ doubles between the early and the late period for r
ST 
and increases by about a half for r
OD 
8. Considering only, to save space, the results with rm
INT , 90% 
of the adjustment toward the equilibrium PT is realized within three months (66% in the pre-break 
period) and completed within a semester (within a year before); Table 4. The evidence is therefore 
of a faster PT for the main lending rates. 
r
TOP.  The findings in the case of the lending rate for the top rated firms are similar across 
approaches for the equilibrium PT: close to unity for the extended period April 1995 - February 
2004 in the CoFA; shrinking from unity to approximately four fifths in the MPA. The one-step 
estimates of θ are again higher in the post break-period, though smaller in comparison with the 
other bank rates; γ0 is slightly higher than for r
ST.  
 
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
  
5)  Taking into account, to save space, only the one-step procedure to investigate 
whether asymmetric effects can be detected for positive and negative changes of rm
INT, the 
estimation of separate short run dynamics coefficients does not produce a better fit (Table 5). We 
report the estimates only for the post-break period, that differently from the earlier one includes  
both negative and positive changes in the driving rates. Two features are worth mentioning: first, 
the null of symmetry cannot be rejected for r
ST and r
OD in the recent period; second, the null for r
TOP 
 is instead rejected and  impact PT is higher for negative changes in the driving rate. 
                           
                                   [TABLE 5 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
                                                 
8 The somehow compensating changes of β and θ in the post-break period could raise suspicions of identification 
difficulties owing to the relatively short sample period and the low variability of regressors. As a check we used a linear 
specification for the one-step procedure, leaving the data to determine the coefficient for the (lagged) driving rate. To 
this end we imposed β=1 in the ECM regressor and introduced as a further regressor  the lagged once market rate, in 
levels. The results (available on request) provide support to the estimates presented in the paper.      
  9Overall, in the Italian case, the econometric exercise points to a lower equilibrium PT 
associated with Stage Three of EMU for r
ST  and even more for r
OD  , with values sizably below 
unity, while no change is detectable for r
TOP .  
The findings differ from some recent research, with the partial  exception of  CoFA results 
of Sander-Kleimeier (2004a, b). The one-step estimation procedure, beside the widely used EG one 
corroborates these results, because it overcomes the critique of small sample bias for 
superconsistent estimates. The distinction between MPA and CoFA, linked to the choice of how to 
proxy the driving market rate, does not provide, in contrast to Sander-Kleimeier (2004a, b), a 
distinctive contribution to date structural breaks in equilibrium PTs, provided a suitable search 
methodology is adopted. Overall, the interbank as the driving market rate proves empirically more 
reliable than the overnight one.  
The proposed approach tested in the Italian case is corroborated when considering the 
Portuguese one (Section 4); a tentative interpretation for Italy, based on banking structure 
considerations, is put forward in Section 5.  
 
4.       The Portuguese case 
 
Portugal is the other country, with Italy, that according to Sander-Kleimeier (2004b, Table 
1) has, for r
CB  and r
STF  (Figure 4), break-points very far apart, up to 5 years, according to the MPA 
or the CoFA (Table 2). Moreover, in contrast to Italy, the cointegration hypothesis at the first stage 
of the Engle-Granger procedure is sometimes rejected
9; the range and the direction of changes in 
the equilibrium PTs between pre- and post-break periods are hardly plausible.  
This section investigates whether, on a sample that for both bank rates starts in January 1993 
and ends at October 2002, those  findings are confirmed adopting the proposed approach to search 
for structural breaks. The focus is on dating break-points and on estimating equilibrium PTs, 
because earlier studies do not provide benchmark estimates for γ0 and θ. It is worth recalling that the 
results are not comparable with the Italian ones, owing to the different underlying credit aggregates  
(see Appendix 1).  
 
                           [FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
The supF testing procedure, using either driving market rate, detects a first local maximum 
at the beginning of 1995 (Figure 5). Replicating the procedure for the subsequent period, starting as 
                                                 
9 In these cases the estimation procedure relies on ADL specifications.  
  10usual from April 1995, to remove the outlier of March with its rates spike, indicates a maximum, 
common to both bank rates and for either approach, in October/November 1999 (Figure 6). The EG 
first stage estimates of Eq. (1) in the pre- and post-break periods reject the null of no cointegration 
(Table 6)
10. This outcome reinforces the proposition, suggested by the Italian case, that the 
distinction between MPA and CoFA is not empirically useful when searching for structural breaks. 
It is worth noticing that our results are very similar to Sander-Kleimeier (2004a; Table 2) when 
considering the early break-point with rm
ON. The almost 5 years difference when considering rm
INT 
turns out to be explained by their choice to use a series, drawn from Datastream, available only 
from October 1994 (results available on request). Extending the series back to January 1993 using 
national data yields, in the supF exercise, the results shown in Figures 5-6.  
A remarkable result in the Portuguese case is the almost halving of β across periods for both 
lending rates, and the very similar values of the parameter. An even larger reduction of the PT than 
in Italy, at least for r
STF , adds further evidence against the Angeloni-Ehrman (2003) view for the 
euro area, though Portugal is not specifically analyzed in that study.  
                       
                         [FIGURES 5 AND 6 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
                                   [TABLE 6 APPROXIMATIVELY HERE] 
 
5. A tentative interpretation for the Italian case  
 
A lower equilibrium PT on short term lending in the wake of Stage Three of EMU implies a 
less effective monetary transmission of the ECB impulses to the Italian and the Portuguese credit 
markets and, plausibly, owing to the banking intermediation key role for bank dependent SMEs, to 
the real economy.  
In the Italian case, an interpretation, within a static industrial organization scheme à la 
Klein- Monti, of a mark-up increase runs contrary to recent studies documenting that the banking 
sector has become more competitive during the 90s (Angelini-Cetorelli 2003). The declining, 
though still higher than the euro area average, differential between lending and borrowing rates 
through 2003 (Oecd 2005) supports this view. The static industrial organization scheme can be 
however hardly applied to lending rates determination, especially in a period when bank-customer 
relationships underwent dramatic changes.  
The econometric investigation in this paper provides a suggestive piece of evidence: the 
divergent pattern of equilibrium PTs  for the minimum rate r
TOP  in comparison with the lending 
                                                 
10 The ADF tests, always passed, for the I(1) feature of the bank and market rates series, in the pre- and post-break 
  11rates to non-primary  borrowers,  r
ST  and r
OD. This pattern is compatible with a credit market where 
top rated borrowers have kept exploiting their bargaining power with banks, with lending rates 
close to money market ones, whereas enhanced relationship lending with the bulk of  customers has 
produced the expected intertemporal interest rates smoothing (Berlin-Mester 1998). Asymmetric 
effects for the short run PT lend additional support to this interpretation: while the parameter for 
r
TOP is in absolute terms lower when the market rate increases and viceversa, there is no such 
evidence for the other rates (Table 5).   
Two classical indicators of credit market structure – the extent of multiple lending 
relationships and the share of the main bank’s loans – point to a strengthened relationship lending, 
especially after the introduction of euro. According to the BIP database of Bank of Italy, the 
average number of banks per borrower between end-June 1999 and end-March 2004 decreased by 
one sixth for non financial enterprises with credit lines between 500,000 and one million euro and 
more than one fifth for larger amounts; the share of the main bank rose by about 5 to 9 percentage 
points. It is worth remarking that these indicators moved much more slowly between end-March 
1998
11  and end-June 1999, when a break-point occurs in the equilibrium PT for r
ST: the former 
decreased by about 5 per cent, the latter did not change. Taking into account that the indicators did 
not appreciably differ from early 1994, it can be safely inferred that in a decade their changes 
overlap with the post-break period.   
Additional factors, internal and external to the banking industry, support the hypothesis of  
intensified relationship lending: 
i)  the consolidation process helped reducing the average number of banks per 
borrower  partly because of a mechanical effect - fewer banks -, partly because the increase of 
banks belonging to a group produces more uniformity in lending practices, thus mitigating arbitrage 
opportunities across lenders; 
ii)  the mutual convenience, for banks and firms, to reduce information asymmetries 
through more stable relationships may have been enhanced by the Basel Accord revision process, 
started almost in coincidence with the advent of euro, that emphasizes a better assessment of credit 
risk via external and internal ratings
12. 
The intertemporal smoothing of lending rates is beneficial not only to borrowers, but also to 
banks. They can in fact stabilize their interest margin, which is affected by a low PT to market rates 
                                                                                                                                                                  
periods, are not reported, to save space (results available on request).   
11 The quarterly series on the BIP data base, though with a slight discontinuity in 2000, starts on March 1998.  
12 This is presumably more the case for SMEs, whose creditworthiness may be more sensitive to qualitative elements 
that need a deeper knowledge of their business and a closer monitoring or a stronger relationship with their 
management. On the contrary, larger firms, with presumably more reliable and market-disciplined financial managers, 
may have their ratings driven mostly by quantitative elements. 
  12for about two fifths of their liabilities, namely demand and saving deposits. The equilibrium PT for 
demand deposits has considerably reduced in recent years, characterized by low money market rates 
and almost nil depositors’ remuneration, down from 0.61 to 0.44 in the same break-free periods 
identified for the lending rates
13. Such a pattern implies a greater risk of margin erosion on fund 
raising when market rates decline, as in most of the post-break period. A reduction of the PT on 
short term lending rates, as in fact happened according to the evidence provided in this paper, could 
have helped to mitigate this risk.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The paper makes several contributions to the empirical literature on lending rates PT.  
Methodology. First, a strategy is suggested to endogenously search for structural breaks in 
cointegrated relations, when the researcher’s interest is for the latest break-point. Second, the 
econometric investigation through the two-step Engle-Granger approach is supplemented with a 
one-step single-equation procedure, in order to better assess the precision of key-parameter 
estimates and to implement the Ericsson-MacKinnon test for cointegration adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.  
Data. The determination of short term lending rates is related, following the literature, to 
two alternative driving market rates. In the Italian case the analysis is extended, aside from the 
sample period, to the overdrafts interest rate, because of an ex ante better maturity matching with 
the marginal cost proxy.  
EMU. The econometric investigation shows that Stage Three of EMU has not implied in its 
wake a strengthened monetary transmission in the Italian case, at least considering the size of 
equilibrium PT for short term lending rates: the estimated parameter has shrunk to around 0.7 (0.6 
for the overdraft component), down from almost unity, in the post-break period. No structural 
change is detected in the equilibrium, slightly less than one, PT for the lending rate to top rated 
borrowers. The equilibrium PT has fallen even more, by almost a half, in Portugal. These results are 
only partly offset, for the two main short term lending rates in the Italian case, by a faster 
adjustment, that is complete within a semester instead of a year.  
Interestingly, the latest break-points cluster around the second semester 1999 in both 
countries, irrespective of the driving market rate, in sharp contrast with structural changes occurring 
as early as 1994 and 1995, a result that previous studies rationalized on the grounds of expected 
reduced variability of money market rates and of inflation convergence induced by the monetary 
                                                 
13 EG first stage estimates; the one-step estimation results (available on request) are similar. 
  13unification (Sander-Kleimeier 2004b). The claim that different driving market rates, following a 
monetary policy or a cost of funds approach, may yield different break-points is disputed: once a 
suitable methodology of search is adopted, the dates are shown to cluster very closely. 
The overall results of this paper challenge the view, recently put forward by several authors, 
that  EMU has in its wake enhanced the effectiveness of monetary transmission via the banking 
sector and made it more homogeneous across countries, because of rising and converging 
equilibrium PTs. The findings of this study uncover an as yet incomplete path to an even monetary 
transmission of ECB’s impulses to national credit markets, should the PT increase in countries other 
than Italy and Portugal after the introduction of euro be confirmed.  
 Two research themes worth pursuing in future, in the light of these results are, first, to 
extend the proposed methodology to endogenously search for break-points to other EMU countries, 
and, second, to assess on panel data the suggested interpretation, for the Italian case, of a link 
between the PT reduction on short lending rates and the strengthening of relationship lending in 
coincidence with (and possibly owing to) the monetary unification.     
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  16Appendix 1  – The data 
 
The national, unharmonized, retail bank rates (National Retail Interest Rates, NRIR) 
collected by the ECB refer to types of loans and deposits representatives of a country banking 
industry and are grouped into 6 macro categories of lending rates and 5 of deposit rates
14. 
Italy.  The short term lending rates analysed in this paper for Italy
15 are: 
-  r
ST : average rate, weighted by stocks, on short term (maturity up to 18 months) 
loans, with lending to enterprises accounting for about a half (NRIR acronym: N4_1). The 
aggregate accounts for about half of total loans; 
-       r
OD : average rate, weighted by stocks, on overdrafts
16. The aggregate amounts to 
slightly less than a half of short term loans (Figure A3); 
-         r
TOP: minimum rate, computed as a weighted average by stocks, on short term term 
loans to firms (NRIR acronym : N4_2)
17.  
It is worth noticing that Italy is the only country, in the NRIR database, with interest rates 
referring to outstanding stocks instead of new businesses. 
The sample period goes from January 1993
18 to February 2004, the last month the series are 
published. The discontinuity is due to the introduction of new harmonized interest rate series
19. For 
instance, in the overlapping period (January 2003 – February 2004) of the new and old overdraft 
interest rate series
20 the levels are quite different, because of a new sample of reporting banks and of 
new methods to collect rates (end-of-month instead of an average of ten-days data).   
Portugal. The short term lending rates analysed in this paper for Portugal are r
CB and r
STF , 
average rates for commercial bills (NRIR acronym: N4_1) and loans (NRIR acronym: N4_2) to 
private non-financial enterprises firms with  91 to 180 days maturity, respectively.  
                                                 
14 http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/interest/html/retail.en.html.  
15 Two other series, N2 and N5, average rates, weighted by new medium-long term (maturity beyond 18 months) 
businesses to firms and households, respectively, are not analyzed owing to the absence of a reliable market rate that 
could satisfactorily proxy their marginal cost throughout the entire time span. The financial characteristics of the 
aggregates (average maturity and interest rate fixation) have indeed changed during the period, spanning across a wide 
range of maturities and comprising fixed- and variable rate contracts, with time-varying proportions. 
16 Source: Banca Informativa Pubblica (BIP) of the Bank of Italy.  
17 The data refer to the first decile of short term loans to firms, ordered by increasing interest rates.  
18 Data for many EMU countries are available only since early 1990s. Following the literature, the sample period starts 
after the 1992 EMS crisis.     
19 As of January 2003 the ECB collects a new set of harmonized bank rates statistics, that relate to aggregates with 
common features across the EMU countries, such as, for instance, the initial horizon of rate determination, an aspect 
that provides a synthetic representation of the contract maturity and of the rate fixation. Though bound to be the ideal 
data base for PT empirical analysis across countries, the as yet short sample and the low variability of the money market 
rates in the reporting period hinder econometric exercises focused on long run parameters (see also Baele et al. 2004). 
20 In the period January 2003-February 2004 the levels of the interest rates in the new harmonized series were on 
average higher by 43 basis points.   
  17The sample period goes from January 1993
21 to October 2002.  
For both countries, the driving money market rates are the one-month interbank (rm
INT) and 
the overnight (rm
ON) rates, chosen, as in Sander-Kleimeier (2004a), because they are the most 
correlated with the bank rates (see Figure 1 and Table A1 for Italy). The data for Italy were 
downloaded from the Bank of Italy website. For Portugal, the overnight rate series was downloaded 
from the Bank of Portugal website; for the one-month interbank rate series, owing to a missing 
value at April 2001, the Datastream series was used as in Sander-Kleimeier (2004a). The series 
starts however at October 1994; it was extended back to January 1993 inserting the data 
downloaded from the Bank of Portugal website
22.  
                                                 
21 Data for many EMU countries are available only since early 1990s. Following the literature, the sample period starts 
after the 1992 EMS crisis.     
22 The NRIR series ends at December 2002, with another missing value at November 2002. 
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a For data description see Appendix 1. 
b 10-years Government rate not statistically significant in equilibrium PT 
estimation. 


















  20Table 3                                       Italy: Alternative ECM estimation procedures  















ST:  post-break 
1 month interbank 






(.05)  .75 2.06  .27 .52 CDRW = .52*** 
ADF = -2.94** 



















(.04)  .75 2.01  .97 .96 CDRW = .85*** 











(.05)  .73 1.74  .98 .23 EM = -2.59 
 
r
ST:  pre-break 







(.05)  .73 2.14  .57 .30 CDRW = .33* 
ADF = -2.84* 











.83 1.88  .07 .80 








(.04)  .73 2.14  .65 .18 CDRW = .44** 












.84 2.18  .55 .50 
EM = -2.35 
r
OD:  post-break 







(.06)  .65 1.90  .01 .45 CDRW = .37* 
ADF = -2.34 


















(.05)  .68 1.57  .20 .03 CDRW = .53*** 











(.05)  .68 2.00  .85 .65 EM = -5.00*** 
r
OD: pre-break 







(.05)  .64 2.19  .54 .14 CDRW = .31 
ADF = -2.83 










(.06)  .76 1.68  .51 .44 EM = -7.16*** 
Overnight 






(.05)  .68 2.16  .77 .13 CDRW = .39** 
ADF = -3.04** 
Overnight 









(.04)  .78 2.07  .92 .76 EM = -1.71 
r
TOP
1 month interbank  
(EG 2-step) 
.31  .93  -.14 
(.04) 
.29 
(.04)  .87 2.22  .09 .08 CDRW = .42** 
ADF = -4.74*** 














 (EG 2-step) 
.66  .84  -.16 
(.08) 
.27 
(.03)  .91 1.96  .04 .46 CDRW = .84*** 
ADF = -4.41*** 
Overnight 













 (EG 2-step) 
.35  .93  -.25 
(.09) 
.33 
(.08)  .80 2.31  .48 .23 CDRW = .56*** 
ADF = -4.24*** 
Overnight 









(.08)  .88 2.08  .39 .70 -5.32***  
1 Heteroskedasticity consistent whenever the White test is below the 5% significance level. 
2 p-values for the Jarque-Bera test under the null of  
normality of residuals. 
3 p-value for the Breusch-Godfrey test under the null of no first order correlation of residuals. 
4 Critical values, computed for 
samples of 100 observations, under the null of I(1) first stage residuals,  at the  1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance: 0.51, 0.38, 0.32. 
5 
Asymptotic critical values under the null of I(1) first stage residuals at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance; ADF with constant and up to 
2 lags (MacKinnon 1991). 
6 Critical values, adjusted for the degrees-of-freedom, in the single-equation ECM procedure (Ericsson-MacKinnon 2002). 
[.] : coefficients not significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.   
  21Table 4               Italy:  Pass-through at 3, 6 and 12 months and speed of adjustment (%) to equilibrium  
                    (computed out of pre- and post-break single-equation estimates with one month interbank rate
1)  
 





































1 See Table 3, including other short-term dynamics coefficients omitted there.  
 
 
Table 5                  Italy: Asymmetries in short term pass-throughs of one-month interbank rate   
                                          (estimation procedure: single-equation ECM; std error in brackets
1) 
 


































.66 1.89 .23  .35  .54 
r













(.04) .90 2.20 .69  .14  .00 
1 See Table 3, including other short-term dynamics coefficients omitted there. 
2 p-value for a Wald test under the null 
of equality between the sum of  γ+’s and of  γ-‘s.  
 
 
Table 6                            Portugal:    Equilibrium lending rates pass-throughs 
                                     (Engle-Granger procedure first step) 
 




1 month intb  99:11 – 02:10  4.87 .66  1.48***  -5.05***  r
CB
Overnight  99:12 – 02:10  4.99 .64  1.48***  -4.54*** 
1 month intb  99:12 – 02:10  2.57  .78  1.38***  -4.17**  r
STF
Overnight  99:12 – 02:10  2.83  .72  1.30***  -3.91** 
pre-break 
1 month intb  95:04 – 99:10  4.17  1.24  0.97***  -5.25***  r
CB
Overnight  95:04 – 99:11  3.97  1.30  1.13***  -4.41*** 
1 month intb  95:06 –99:11  1.31  1.36  1.38***  -5.54***  r
STF
Overnight  95:04 – 99:11  1.29  1.39  1.43***  -5.49*** 
1 See Table 3. 
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Figure  1                                   Italy: Short term lending and market rates 
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Figure 2                                            Italy: Rolling Chow tests  
                                                  (sample period: 1993.01-2004.02)  
 








95 Apr-9 Jan- 5Jul-95 Oct-95 Jan-96 Apr-96Jul-96 Oct-96 Jan-97 Apr-97Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98Jul-98 Oct-98 Jan-99 Apr-99Jul-99 Oct-99 Jan-00 Apr-00Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01Jul-01 Oct-01
% critical value 10% critical value 1% critical value 5 rTOP rOD rST
 
 




































rST rOD rTOP critical value 1% critical value 5% critical value 10%
 
  24 
Figura 3                                      Italy: Rolling Chow tests 
                                    (period after first break-point: 1995.04-2004.02)  
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Figure 4                                 Portugal: Short term lending and market rates  
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Figure 5                 Portugal: Rolling Chow tests with  one-month interbank and overnight rates  
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Figure 6                 Portugal: Rolling Chow tests with  one-month interbank and overnight rates  
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  27          1 See Figure 5 on first break-points.
Appendix 2 – Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1               Italy: Correlations between (first differenced) lending (r
OD, r
ST and r
TOP) and market 
(overnight, 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-months interbank) rates 
 









INT 0.88                   
rm
INT3 0.77  0.94                
rm
INT6 0.68  0.87  0.96             
rm
INT12 0.57 0.75 0.87 0.95            
r
OD   0.60 0.58 0.54 0.48 0.40        
r
ST 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.42 0.99    
r
TOP 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.45 0.87 0.90 
 
 
Table A2                                  Italy: Unit root tests for lending and market rates 
                                                  
ADF
1 Break-free periods  Lending and market 
rates  Levels Differences 
rm
INT







TOP -2.31 -9.16*** 
rm
ON










































INT -1.81 -4.13*** 





1 With constant and trend in the pre-break period for the level series; with constant only, otherwise.  
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Figure A1                     Replicating Sander&Kleimeier for Italy: Rolling Chow tests  
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Figure A2                                                            Italy: Rolling Chow tests  
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